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This paper presents a critical assessment of Michael Tye’s and David Chalmers’ criticisms of the 
phenomenal concept strategy. The assessment is done with a view to defend the phenomenal concept 
strategy against Tye’s and Chalmers’ arguments. The phenomenal concept strategy is a strategy 
developed by physicalists to defend physicalism in the attempt to address the problem of consciousness. 
For Michael Tye, who was previously an advocate of the phenomenal concept strategy, there is the 
possibility that two or more distinct phenomenal concepts can refer to the same phenomenal experience 
and this indicates that phenomenal concepts have no special status as claimed by physicalists and are, in 
turn, not concepts at all. David Chalmers, on the other hand, raises a dilemma for the phenomenal 
concept strategy by stating that it is either that the strategy cannot explain the epistemic reality (i.e. 
knowledge) of consciousness or that the strategy cannot explain this knowledge in physicalist terms. Any 
of these two indicates that the phenomenal concept strategy is unsuccessful. This paper posits that Tye’s 
and Chalmers’ criticisms misrepresent the stance of the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper 
maintains that the phenomenal concept strategy, if understood differently, still provides a plausible 
support for physicalism in addressing the problem of consciousness. 
Keywords: Consciousness, conceivability argument, knowledge argument, master argument, phenomenal 
concept strategy, physicalism.
Introduction
The quest to account for the possibility of how events, substances or properties in the physical realm 
causally relate with events, substances and properties which are in the mental realm constitutes what is 
referred to as the mind-body problem. In this regard, there are two broad theories, namely dualism and 
monism. Dualism asserts the existence of both the body and the mind as distinct substances, while 
monism asserts the existence of either of the two. Further, and traditionally too, monism can either be 
idealism – the view that the one thing that exists is the mental, or physicalism – the view that the one thing 
that exists is physical. However, most of the recent discourses on the mind-body problem have been 
under the distinction and opposition between dualism and physicalism (Crane 2001:43).
Physicalism, in a general sense, is the philosophical position that the universe and all in it are entirely 
physical. It is the view that the world is constituted of materials and governed by regularities that the 
science of physics is in the best position to identify and describe (Pettit 1993:213). With regard to the 
mind-body problem, physicalism is the thesis that a “person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing 
over and above his body, with all its physical attributes” (Nagel 1965:339). The core of a dualist theory is 
the position that there are mental phenomena and physical entities which exist separately. Dualism rejects 
the physicalist claim by holding that there is an aspect of the human psychology which arguably remains 
elusive to the approach of physicalism. This aspect is consciousness, which is the subjective character of 
experience. It is considered nonphysical and beyond what can be captured in the framework of physics. 
According to dualism, the reality of consciousness falsifies the claim of physicalism and remains an 
intractable problem (Nagel 1997:519). Philosophers who subscribe to this dualist view are antiphysicalists. 
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Antiphysicalists, who are advocates of the reality of consciousness, hold that there is something it is 
like to be in a conscious state; that is, there is a phenomenal feel involved in seeing a rose, suffering from 
headache and so on. Any of such phenomenal feels, antiphysicalists argue, is non-reducible to anything 
physical nor is it explainable in physicalist terms. An experiencing subject’s (i.e. a conscious being) 
knowledge of his/her phenomenal feel is phenomenal knowledge and the concepts that are used to express 
this knowledge are phenomenal concepts. On the other side of the divide are physicalists who are 
advocates of physicalism. Some physicalists have banked on the nature of phenomenal concepts to argue 
that phenomenal experiences are reducible to physicalist terms. Hence, the phenomenal concept strategy 
appeals to phenomenal concepts; that is, the concepts that conscious beings possess when they become 
aware of the qualitative character of their phenomenal experience via introspection.
The ‘what it is like’ to be in a phenomenal conscious state forms the phenomenal property of that 
conscious state which in turn is subsumed under a concept. Whenever one is in a phenomenal conscious 
state, one brings such state to bear under a concept and this is referred to as a phenomenal concept. 
According to physicalists, concepts of consciousness are special in a way that concepts of physical 
phenomena are not and this can be said to have informed the antiphysicalists’ erroneous view about what 
phenomenal concepts pick out (refer to) ( Alter and Walter 2006:5). It has been argued that phenomenal 
concepts are not a priori reducible to physical concepts. One way that phenomenal concept strategists 
have responded to this criticism is to argue that there are many concepts, such as ‘the’ and ‘that’, which 
are not physical concepts but do not refer to non-physical entities. Thus, the fact that phenomenal 
concepts are irreducible to physical concepts does not mean that phenomenal concepts are not 
explainable in physicalist terms. Proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy argue that, despite the 
special nature of the concepts of consciousness, an experiencing subject’s possession of the concepts can 
be explained in physicalist terms (Chalmers 2006: 167). They hold that the puzzles of consciousness are 
mistaken for granting that the epistemic gap that is entailed in the view that phenomenal concepts are not 
a priori reducible to physical concepts implies a metaphysical gap, i.e. there is a difference between 
phenomenal consciousness and the physical in reality.
Michael Tye and David Chalmers have criticised the position of the phenomenal concept strategy. Tye 
(2009:53), for instance, argues that the phenomenal concept strategy does not allow for fine-grained 
individuation of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties. This means that the phenomenal 
concept strategy allows different concepts that have different conceptual individuation to refer to the 
same phenomenal concept. For example, the concepts ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ refer to the same 
entity (Venus) but the concepts play different conceptual roles which make them different concepts. In the 
case of phenomenal concepts and experiences, Tye argues that the possibility that two or more 
phenomenal concepts can apply to the same phenomenal experience indicates that phenomenal concepts 
have no special status and are not concepts in the sense in which physicalists conceive of them. Chalmers 
appeals to the conceivability argument and argues that if the complete macrophysical truth about the 
universe without the phenomenal features of human beings is conceivable, then it follows that the 
phenomenal features of human beings are not physically explicable. On the other hand, if the complete 
macrophysical truth about the universe without the phenomenal features of human beings is not 
conceivable, phenomenal features of human beings cannot explain our knowledge of phenomenal 
experiences (Chalmers 2006:174). This raises a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy.
In what follows, discussion in Section 1 will focus on a critical examination of the reasons behind 
physicalists’ appeal to the phenomenal concept strategy. In Sections 2 and 3, I present a critical exposition 
and assessment of Michael Tye’s and David Chalmers’ criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy 
respectively. The last section will contain an attempt to rescue the phenomenal concept strategy by 
weighing its strength against some puzzles of consciousness which serve as the foundation of Tye’s and 
Chalmers’ criticisms of it. This is intended to show that these criticisms against the phenomenal concept 
strategy are inadequate.
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Phenomenal concept strategy: a physicalist’s solution to the problem of consciousness
One of the reasons that have been identified with physicalists’ appeal to the phenomenal concept strategy 
is the puzzles of consciousness.2 These puzzles include the explanatory gap, the zombie argument, and the 
knowledge argument. In the puzzle of the explanatory gap, it is argued that no amount of explanation of 
mental states in physical terms is sufficient and adequate to explain mental states (Levine 2002:354-361). 
The zombie argument maintains that if it is intelligibly conceivable that there is a possible world of 
zombies, which is in all microphysical aspects similar to our world but lacks the phenomenal consciousness 
of what it is like to be a zombie or to be in a conscious state, it follows that physicalism has no exhaustive 
explanation of all that is in our world. It shows that there are non-physical aspects in our world (Chalmers 
1996:84). Frank Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary in the black-and-white room popularises the 
knowledge argument which states that that given the complete knowledge of all physical facts, there are 
some facts of the world that remained unknown (Jackson 2002:273-280). 
Advocates of the phenomenal concept strategy agree with the antiphysicalists’ argument that there 
seems to be an epistemic gap between physical processes and phenomenal experiences but that this does 
not imply that there is an ontological gap between them. To admit of an ontological gap is to submit to 
dualism, but the physicalists hold that the concepts used to refer to phenomenal experiences are only 
conceptually different from concepts used to refer to physical processes; they refer to the same thing in 
the external world. This is likened to the way “H2O” and “water” are conceptually different but refer to 
the same thing in the external world. Thus, for the physicalists, concepts may be dualistic; what they refer 
to is one. 
Another reason is the failure of some versions of physicalism/materialism to successfully explain the 
oneness of reality. Some of these versions include behaviourism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, 
reductive and eliminative materialism. Among other criticisms that have been levelled against these 
versions of materialism/physicalism, is the accusation that they stand deficient in the face of the puzzles 
that the problem of consciousness presents to their thesis. For instance, eliminative materialism posits that 
we eliminate all talk about phenomenal experiences from our everyday vocabulary, everyday language-
use, but how do we do this when confronted with the issue of Frank Jackson’s Mary who learns a new 
thing after her release from the black-and-white room? How do we construct our language to avoid 
explaining Mary’s post-release experience? Although, the implausibility of eliminative materialism is not to 
be solely hinged on its futuristic approach (since its advocates hold that science would soon develop to 
such an extent as to eradicate phenomenal language in the nearest future) (Churchland 1981:67), 
eliminative materialism seems hopeless in dealing with the puzzles of consciousness.
Considering the first reason listed above, the phenomenal concept strategy is adopted by physicalists 
as a tenable method for explaining the puzzles presented by the problem of consciousness. Brian Loar’s 
paper “Phenomenal States” has been identified, arguably, as the source of the idea of the phenomenal 
concept strategy.3 In the paper, Loar calls the conceptions of the phenomenal experiences that conscious 
beings have phenomenal concepts which are conceptually irreducible and do not a priori imply physical-
functional concepts and that these features of the phenomenal concepts are what have blinded anti-
physicalists into thinking that phenomenal states have distinct existence. But for Loar, the irreducibility of 
phenomenal concepts is compatible with the thesis of physicalism since it is possible to have it that way 
and also “take phenomenal qualities to be identical with physical-functional properties” (Loar 2002:295-
2.  Michael Tye argues that physicalists believe they can explain the epistemic gap in the explanatory gap argument, the con-
ceivability thesis in the zombie argument and the knowledge status of post-release Mary by appealing to phenomenal con-
cept so as to show that all these puzzles can be brought under the physicalist system. See Tye, M. (2009). Consciousness 
Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, London: MIT Press, p.42.
3.  Daniel Stoljar acknowledges Loar’s paper “Phenomenal States” as the locus classicus of the phenomenal concept strategy. 
See Stoljar, D. (2005). “Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts”, Mind, 20.
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296). For him, when the special nature of phenomenal concepts is taken into consideration, it would be 
understood that they pick out the same referents as physical concepts (Loar 2002: 295-296). 
For instance, in the knowledge argument, Mary gains no new fact. She only learns old fact in a new 
way, just like a person who has long known that “morning star” refers to the planet Venus and has come to 
know, newly, that “evening star” refers to the same planet Venus. This individual does not know anything 
new, but knows something in a new way. Likewise Mary, the phenomenal concept she uses to instantiate 
her post-release phenomenal experience of red is a new way of learning the colour-experience which she 
has had in her pre-release days under the physicalist-induced system. It follows that just as “evening star” 
and “morning star” are conceptually different but both refer to the planet Venus, so also are physical 
concepts and phenomenal concepts conceptually different but pick out the same thing which is explicable 
in physicalist terms. 
In the case of the conceivability of zombies, the phenomenal concept strategy allows that the 
conceivability of zombies is coherent but rejects the reasoning that it is ontologically possible. The 
allowance for the conceivability of zombies is attributed to the conceptual difference between 
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts, but since this difference does not translate to an ontological 
difference between what these concepts pick out, the ontological existence of zombie is denied. More so, 
it is conceivable that water is not H2O, but it is metaphysically impossible that this is so. The puzzle of the 
explanatory gap is dealt with, by phenomenal concept strategy, by drawing attention to the a priori
irreducibility of phenomenal concepts to physical concepts. The relationship between phenomenal 
concepts and physical concepts is a posteriori and this explains why there seems to be an explanatory gap 
which does not in any way signify an ontological gap between physical processes and phenomenal 
experiences. It is when it is shown that referents of both phenomenal concepts and physical concepts are 
the same that one can know that they do not refer to ontologically different entities but are only different 
on conceptual grounds. 
All of these notwithstanding, the phenomenal concept strategy has been subjected to criticisms by 
both physicalists and anti-physicalists alike. Physicalists who argue against it do so for different reasons 
while still holding on to the thesis of physicalism. Antiphysicalists who criticise it do so to maintain that the 
strategy does not solve the problem of consciousness. In the next two sections, I will examine some of 
these criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy headlined by Michael Tye and David Chalmers.
Michael Tye’s criticism of the phenomenal concept strategy
Michael Tye, who used to be an advocate of the phenomenal concept strategy, in a turnaround, has 
become a critic of the strategy.4 In his book, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal 
Concepts, Tye disowns the specialness of phenomenal concepts, a position which he previously held, and 
claims that there are in fact no phenomenal concepts (Tye 2009: 39-53). He argues that there are 
difficulties with the idea of phenomenal concepts such that one is to conclude that there are no 
phenomenal concepts. This is a nihilist view about phenomenal concepts. To prove his point, Tye begins 
with a conceptual analysis of the terms “concept” and “thought content”. He argues, for instance, that the 
concepts “coriander” and “cilantro” are two concepts that refer to the same thing (a spice) but the 
thought-content of a conscious being who thinks “coriander” to be a spice would be different from that of 
the conscious being who thinks “cilantro” to be a spice (Tye 2009: 39). This is to say that the phenomenal 
concept strategy does not allow for fine-grained individuation of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal 
properties. As concepts have different thought-contents, the phenomenal thought about a conscious 
experience maybe different if there are at least two concepts that refer to the conscious experience. Tye 
4.  Michael Tye previously held a supportive position for the phenomenal concept strategy arguing that one of the puzzles of 
consciousness, that is, the explanatory gap, is an illusion if the features of phenomenal concepts are clearly understood. 
See Tye, M. (1999). “Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion”, Mind, 108(432):705-725.
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argues that the possibility that two or more phenomenal concepts can apply to the same phenomenal 
experience indicates that phenomenal concepts have no special status (Tye 2009: 56).
He argues further, in rejecting the specialness of phenomenal concepts, that arguments for the claim 
of concept possession are uninformative. He samples two likely answers which advocates of the 
phenomenal concepts may give to the question: “What is it to say that one possesses a concept?” The first 
answer may be that one possesses a given concept on the condition that one can exercise that concept on 
one’s thoughts. This answer suggests a full understanding of the concept, but Tye considers this not 
informative since one can have a grasp of a phenomenal concept even with partial understanding of the 
concept in question. For instance, he argues that one cannot have the concepts “fortnight” and “red” 
without a grasp of the fact that they are a period of time and colour respectively, (Tye 2009: 41). Another 
answer can thus be the partial understanding of a concept, which Tye considers intuitively more attractive. 
In other words, the claim that phenomenal concepts are concepts possessed by conscious beings under 
which they subsume their phenomenal experience need not require full understanding of the concepts in 
question. This, it must be noted, indicates another build-up to Tye’s nihilist claim about phenomena 
concepts. In a further argument, Tye states that:
There is really nothing special about phenomenal concepts. The concepts we use in forming 
conceptions of our phenomenal states via introspection are just like many other concepts. 
Sometimes we use demonstratives and sometimes we use general concepts. These concepts, I 
grant, are a priori irreducible to physical concepts … But this is true of many, many concepts 
that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness … (Tye 2 009: 56).
Tye’s claim, here, is that phenomenal concepts, for being irreducibly conceptual or physical, are in the 
same category as many other non-phenomenal concepts and as such they are not special and also cannot 
do the task that physicalists tend to put them to in tackling the problem of consciousness.
 This claim is one-sided. The fact that phenomenal concepts share some features with non-
phenomenal concepts does not make them non-special. After all, Tye’s arguments have only shown that 
phenomenal concepts share “some” exact features with non-phenomenal concepts but not “all”. It could 
not have been the case that the formulation, the linguistic use, the reference-fixing pattern and some 
other features of phenomenal concepts are all in tandem with the same characteristics in non-phenomenal 
concepts. All of these notwithstanding, Tye still maintains a physicalist stand against the problem of 
consciousness. The only change is his position on phenomenal concepts, which he now claims are not 
special and as a result are non-existent in the sense in which physicalists appeal to them. 
In the light of this, to start with, Esa Diaz-Leon rejects Tye’s claim that because phenomenal concepts 
refer directly to the entity they pick out, phenomenal concepts do not have fine-grained individuation 
(Diaz-Leon 2011:161). She argues that the issue of a fine-grained individuation requires that two concepts 
which have the same referents can have different individuation conditions. Thus, the phenomenal 
concepts satisfy. More so, Diaz-Leon argues, there is a uniqueness in the way phenomena concepts 
present their referents such that one cannot a priori know that different phenomena concepts are co-
referential. This argument (Diaz-Leon’s) is more plausible. The reason for this is that Tye’s new position 
betrays the uniqueness attributable to phenomenal concepts which make them different from other 
concepts. After all, what Tye sets out to do is to reject the phenomenal concept. This, however, should 
not becloud his impartial rationalisation of an account of the phenomenal concept.
In addition, Diaz-Leon also calls in question Tye’s demand for the condition to be satisfied for 
phenomenal concepts to explain the conceivability of zombies. The condition stipulated by Tye is that 
phenomenal concepts must be distinct from physical concepts in a way different from the fact that 
phenomenal concepts are irreducible to physical concepts. This condition shows a misconstruction of 
what the phenomenal concept strategy aims to show and that there is no need for the phenomenal 
concepts strategy to be committed to the fact that phenomenal concepts must be radically distinct from 
physical concepts. Thus, Tye’s condition that to solve the puzzle of the conceivability of zombie argument, 
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a phenomenal concept must be radically distinct from physical concepts does not hold water, because this 
is implicit in most accounts of the phenomenal concepts. 
There is also the claim that phenomenal concepts must be perspectival to explain the reason Mary 
lacks a phenomenal concept in the black-and-white room. This, according to Tye, is because possessing a 
phenomenal concept about a conscious experience requires having that experience, and since Mary does 
not experience red in the black-and-white room, she could not have possessed the phenomenal concept 
“red”. In response, Diaz-Leon states that the phenomenal concept strategy can still allow for this in a 
fashion that suggests that the phenomenal concepts of never-had-before conscious experience are 
complex phenomenal concepts that can be possessed by bringing together different basic phenomenal 
concepts that are related to them (Diaz-Leon 2011:163). I subscribe to Diaz-Leon’s view on this. For 
instance, a conscious being who has had the experience of the taste of rice at time t1 and also had the taste 
of beans at time t2 and has developed phenomenal concepts for each taste experience can form a 
phenomenal concept for the taste experience of eating rice and beans together at the same time. This 
explains the claim of combining basic phenomenal concepts of certain experiences to form complex 
phenomenal concepts of experiences yet to be had. This also explains the fact that whatever phenomenal 
concept Mary deploys to refer to the phenomenal experience of red, it may be a combination of more 
basic phenomenal concepts of white-and-black colour experience she has had in the white-and-black 
room. 
In all, Tye’s argument against the phenomenal concept strategy can be summed up as one which turns 
a blind eye to more fundamental features of phenomenal concepts to create a straw man against the 
phenomenal concept strategy and base his position of the non-existence of phenomenal concepts on it. 
Some of these features which include the view that phenomenal concepts are a priori irreducible to 
physical concepts indicate that the relationship between these concepts (since they are said to pick out the 
same thing) can only be known through empirical investigation of the referents they pick out in the 
physical body.
David Chalmers’ criticism of the phenomenal concept strategy
According to David Chalmers, one of the responses to the explanatory gap as one of the puzzles of 
consciousness is by those who admit the presence of an explanatory gap between physical processes and 
phenomenal processes but attribute the gap to the way human beings conceive of consciousness 
(Chalmers 2006:167-180). Against the backdrop of this phenomenal concept strategy-inspired response 
to the explanatory gap, Chalmers raises a dilemma which in either way proves the phenomenal concept 
strategy unsuccessful. He puts the dilemma as follows: 
… if the relevant features of phenomenal concepts can be explained in physical terms, the 
features cannot explain the explanatory gap. And if the features can explain the explanatory gap, 
they cannot themselves be explained in physical terms (Chalmers 2006:168).
In other words, owing to the claim of advocates of the phenomenal concept strategy that the possession 
of phenomenal concepts is subsumable under physicalist terms, Chalmers’ dilemma argument suggests 
that it is either the case that phenomenal concepts have physicalist expression and fail to explain the 
explanatory gap or that phenomenal concepts can explain the explanatory gap but have no physicalist 
expression. To understand this claim, it is important to explicate Chalmers’ formulation of the thesis of the 
phenomenal concept strategy. He presents the thesis of the phenomenal concept strategy thus: 
Proponents put forward a thesis C attributing certain psychological features – call these the key 
features – to human beings. They (proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy) argue (1) that 
C is true: humans actually have the key features; (2) that C explains our epistemic situation with 
regard to consciousness: C explains why we are confronted with the relevant distractive 
epistemic gaps; and (3) that C itself can be explained in physical terms; one can (at least in 
principle) give a materialistically acceptable explanation of how it is that humans have the key 
features (Chalmers 2006: 172, italics mine).
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For Chalmers, the thesis of the phenomenal concept strategy seems a powerful approach in dealing 
with the problem of consciousness but it does not, in itself, appear to be a direct solution to the problem 
of consciousness. Thus, it can be seen from this preliminary conception of the phenomenal concept 
strategy that Chalmers only considers it to have solved some puzzles which arise as a result of the 
problem of consciousness and not the problem itself. One important question one needs to ask at this 
point is whether Chalmers’ formulation of the phenomenal concept strategy is correct or not. If it is 
correct, is it correct of all versions of the strategy or only some? This I will examine presently.
 Back to the formulations with the three elements which are considered essential to the phenomenal 
concept strategy: Chalmers argues that no account of the phenomenal concepts strategy can satisfy 
elements 2 and 3 at the same time. In this resides the dilemma because, according to him, if element 2 is 
satisfied, element 3 cannot be satisfied and if element 3 is satisfied, element 2 cannot be satisfied all at the 
same time. This is what Chalmers calls the Master Argument against the phenomenal concept strategy. The 
structure of the argument goes thus:
If P and not-C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. 
If P and not-C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation.
From the above, it follows that:
Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our epistemic situation (Chalmers 
2006:174).
The argument states that for any thesis which attributes psychological features to human beings (C), it is 
either that the thesis is entailed a priori by the complete microphysical truth about the universe (P) or not. 
The conjunction of P and not C is conceivable. In other words, what will be the implication of having 
microphysical truths without psychological features? The consequence that would follow this antecedent 
conception is that psychological features of human beings are not physically explicable. The ground for this 
premise is the conceivability of some physical duplicate of human beings (say zombies) which satisfy all the 
P-condition of human beings but lack C-conditions. If this is the case, according to Chalmers, we would 
need further explanation why human beings in this world who satisfy the P-condition still exert the C-
condition. The connection of this argument with the phenomenal concept strategy is that “if it is 
conceivable that P obtains without C obtaining, then we will have just the same sort of explanatory gap 
between physical processes and the relevant features of phenomenal concepts” (Chalmers 2006:175). 
Chalmers cautions that the conceivability entailed in the first premise of the Master Argument has no 
relationship with possibility, for creatures conceivable in the light of P-condition and not C-condition may 
be metaphysically impossible. The conceivability in this is connected to reductive explanation which turns 
on the explanatory gap between consciousness and physicalism. Put differently, the kind of explanation 
required here is that which will show how microphysical truths/facts will a priori entail psychological 
features of human beings and since the conceivability of zombies has shown that this may not always be 
the case, then there is a need for additional explanation for the presence (or existence) of psychological 
features. Thus, the success of the phenomenal concept strategy lies in its ability to explain the epistemic 
gap that seems to exist in explaining how physical fact gives rise to conscious experience upon which 
phenomenal concepts are developed. 
The first premise of the Master Argument appears like an argument which would crumble the position 
of the phenomenal concept strategy, but when examined closely it does not affect the thesis of the 
strategy. The first point to note in the Master Argument is the implicit agreement of the argument with the 
thesis of phenomenal concept strategy that the epistemic gap does not imply an ontological gap. This is 
owing to Chalmers’ clarification of the connection between conceivability and possibility on the one hand 
and the connection between conceivability and reductive explanation on the other hand. Chalmers’ 
argument does not affect the minimum claim of the phenomenal concept strategy. In a situation where it is 
possible to have microphysical truth and not have psychological features, one can as well argue that the 
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demand for an explanation will be asking too much of physicalism, which the phenomenal concept strategy 
has been developed to defend. 
What is implied here is that a world where there are physical truths devoid of psychological features 
poses no threat to explanation of the presence of psychological features in this world. The claim of 
physicalism is that if there is anything that could be called a mental phenomenon, that thing is either 
physical or supervenes on the physical and if there is a world at all that lacks mental phenomena, then 
everything in there still remains physical. 
The second premise of the Master Argument which states that if it is not conceivable to have 
microphysical truth without psychological features then it follows that our psychological features cannot 
explain our epistemic situation, can be simply understood as saying that microphysical truths do not a priori
entail psychological features. Chalmers adds additional premises in order to drive home his point and they 
are as follows:
If P and not-C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C. 
Zombies do not share our epistemic situation. 
If zombies satisfy C but do not share our epistemic situation, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation.
From these follows the conclusion that if P and not-C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation (Chalmers 2006:176).
This second part of the argument assumes that zombies satisfy the C-condition, that is, zombies have 
psychological features; thus, it assumes an avoidance of the problem identified in the first part of the 
argument but comes with its own problem. The problem that would arise for the phenomenal concept 
strategy here is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between conscious beings and 
zombies. How is this so? Chalmers’  argument here assumes that human beings and zombies both satisfy 
the C-condition but only human beings satisfy the E-condition which is about the truth-values and 
epistemic status of the beliefs possessed by human beings, but lacked by zombies. One of the reasons 
given by Chalmers for this disparity in epistemic status is that: 
… zombies have a much less accurate self-conception than conscious beings do. I believe that I 
am conscious, that I have states with remarkable qualitative character available to introspection, 
that these states resist transparent reductive explanation and so on. My zombie twin has 
corresponding beliefs. It is not straightforward to determine just what content these beliefs 
might possess. But there is a strong intuition that these beliefs are false, or at least that they are 
less justified than my beliefs (Chalmers 2006:177).
In sum, the epistemic position of human beings is different from that of zombies; when a zombie displays 
phenomenal ability, it would be different in content from when a human being does same. The point of this 
argument then is that even if some phenomenal concepts yield to physicalist explanation (since it is 
assumed that zombies satisfy the C-condition too) such phenomenal concepts will fail to explain the 
epistemic gap between physical processes/concepts and phenomenal processes/concepts. 
Esa Diaz-Leon (2010: 933-951) objects to this second part of the Master Argument by stating that the 
argument poses no serious threat to the phenomenal concept strategy since phenomenal concepts are 
only required to explain why there is a gap between complete microphysical truth (P) and arbitrary truth 
about phenomenal consciousness (Q) and not to explain the whole of human’s epistemic situation. She 
goes further to argue that what Chalmers bases his claim of the failure of the phenomenal concept 
strategy on is not a strong ground. Chalmers’ claim is that any account of a phenomenal concept of 
psychological features/conscious experience (say C) that follows a priori from microphysical truth (P) will 
fail in the explanation of how features of phenomenal concepts result in the epistemic gap since every 
being that has psychological features has epistemic situation and it is conceivable that zombies have 
psychological features but lack epistemic situation. Diaz-Leon’s response to this is that the relevant 
features of epistemic situation which is the inability to infer truth about phenomenal consciousness a priori
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from physical truths is also satisfied by zombies. Thus, the epistemic situation which Chalmers wants to 
use as the point for saying phenomenal concepts cannot explain is also satisfied at the minimum level by 
zombies. 
Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet (2007:212-235) also argue that Chalmers’ Master Argument
against the phenomenal concept strategy is unsuccessful. They premised their argument on what can be 
called Chalmers’ mistaken conception of epistemic status. Following from the second part of the Master 
Argument where Chalmers argues that, if it is conceivable that a human being and his/her zombie duplicate 
can satisfy the C-condition (that is, have phenomenal concept) but do not share the same epistemic status, 
then phenomenal concepts cannot explain epistemic situation, they argue that zombies do share in human 
beings’ epistemic situation. Their argument for this claim goes thus: a human being and his/her zombie 
duplicate do have concepts they develop to refer to perceptual states they experience, but these concepts 
differ in contents. The content of a human being’s phenomenal concept will involve a phenomenal state 
but that of his/her zombie duplicate could be said to involve “schemenomenal” states. From this, it can 
then be said that a human being and his/her zombie duplicate have beliefs with the same truth-value even 
though their beliefs are about different things. This, in turn, shows that they both share the same epistemic 
situation (Carruthers and Veillet 2007: 224).
Chalmers (2006:185) already pre-empts this kind of physicalist reply when he states that asserting that 
zombies share the same epistemic status as human beings as discussed above will either deflate the 
phenomenal knowledge of a conscious being or inflate the corresponding knowledge of zombies. This 
means that the argument would imply that a zombie knows as much (inflationary) as a human being or that 
a human being knows as little (deflationary) as a zombie and this has counter-intuitive consequences. 
Carruthers’ and Veillet’s response to this is that there is no need to assume such inflationary or 
deflationary turns in the epistemic status of both human beings and zombies. What is needed is the fact of 
pointing out that the objects of the epistemic state are about different things. Where does this argument 
lead? Owing to their claim that Chalmers’ view about epistemic status is wrong, Carruthers and Veillet, 
while trying to avoid this inflationary and deflationary charge, submit thus:
In our view, zombies are still zombies in that they are not phenomenally conscious. Their 
perceptual states don’t have phenomenal feels … Yet they have something playing a certain role 
in their psychology – a role analogous to that phenomenal consciousness plays in ours. They 
have something epistemically just as good as consciousness, but they don’t have anything that is 
phenomenally as good … Even though their schenomenal beliefs are true when our 
corresponding phenomenal beliefs are, their beliefs are, sadly enough, not about the same good 
stuff as our corresponding beliefs – they are not about the feel of experiences (Carruthers and 
Veillet 2007:212-236).
This is to show the fault in the second part of Chalmers’ Master Argument, that it is conceivable that a 
human being and his/her zombie duplicate can satisfy the C-condition and still share the same epistemic 
status; thus it will follow that phenomenal concept can explain our epistemic status contrary to Chalmers’ 
claim.
Phenomenal concept strategy and the puzzles of consciousness
Having discussed some of the criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy and some of the flaws 
involved in the criticisms, I will proceed to examine the viability of the strategy against some of the puzzles 
in which the problem of consciousness manifests itself. This will involve assessing the phenomenal concept 
strategy against the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument. I will attempt an examination of 
the resolution of these puzzles through phenomenal concept strategy. 
The knowledge argument is grounded on a thought experiment where Frank Jackson presents Mary 
who was locked up in a black-and-white room and had therein learned all the physical truths there are to 
be learnt about colours. On being released, Mary had her first experience of red and it is argued that such 
experience cannot be deduced from the physical truths about colours that she has learnt in the room, but 
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she rather acquires new phenomenal truths which are an indication of the falsity of physicalism that 
complete physical truth is the whole truth about the universe (Jackson 2002:273-280).
The success of the knowledge argument is one which will spell doom for physicalism and to avoid this, 
physicalists have found solace in the phenomenal concept strategy. The general assumption that runs 
through most versions of the phenomenal concept strategy is that the knowledge argument is mistaken in 
arriving at a metaphysical conclusion from an epistemological premise.5 Now when dealing with the 
knowledge argument, some of the options open to a physicalist include (1) to reject the notion that Mary 
learns a new fact after her release; (2) to accept that Mary learns a new thing but that which she has learnt 
is subsumable in the physicalist system (see Loar 2002 and Balog 2012). These options are, however, not 
in any way exhaustive of what is available to the physicalist. 
These two options are in tandem with the phenomenal concept strategy’s approach to solving the 
Mary puzzle. The options are consistent with the physicalist claim that the knowledge argument embarks 
on a fallacious route of inferring an ontological gap between physical truth and phenomenal truths from an 
epistemic gap. The epistemic gap which the knowledge argument suggests exists in Mary’s knowledge of 
physical truth and phenomenal truth is one which phenomenal concept strategists argue is derived from a 
mistaken idea of how we deploy concepts. The phenomenal concept strategists hold that the epistemic 
gap is a result of confusions about linguistic conceptualization. This confusion, as earlier stated, is in the 
wrong assumption that since phenomenal concepts are conceptually different, then their referents are 
ontologically different too. With regard to the knowledge argument, phenomenal concept strategists have 
also argued using identity-analogy to drive home their point that Mary, after her release, does not learn any 
new fact or even if it is to be accepted that Mary’s post-release experience is novel, it can all be explained 
away on a contingent mode of identity case. Let us examine, for example, Brian Loar’s take on the 
implication of the misconception about phenomenal concept and identities for the knowledge argument. 
Brian Loar argues that phenomenal concepts are concepts conscious beings develop to instantiate the 
qualities of their phenomenal experiences and these phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible 
and do not a priori imply physical-functional concepts. This, for Loar, is where the anti-physicalist argument 
of an epistemic gap takes its root. These facts about phenomenal concepts seem endearing to the 
antiphysicalist’s position, but Loar claims they are reconcilable to pursue a physicalist project as it is 
possible to accept “introspective concepts and their conceptual irreducibility, and at the same time take 
phenomenal qualities to be identical with physical-functional properties…”(Loar 2002:296). This is to say 
that the conceptual irreducibility of phenomenal concepts or the non-apriori deducibility of physical 
concepts from phenomenal concepts does not deny the fact that these two concepts refer to the same 
thing. To buttress his point, Loar samples two other instances that could serve as counter-examples to the 
claim arrived at in the knowledge argument. The first of these is the case of Max who learns that the bottle 
in front of him contains CH3CH2OH but does not know that the same bottle contains alcohol. At that 
time, Max has no concept to depict the concept “alcohol”. When Max later comes to learn about the 
substance called alcohol, it can be said, on the reasoning of the knowledge argument, that he learns a new 
thing which is not identical with CH3CH2OH. Loar asserts that this does not follow. The second is the 
case of Margot who learns about the element aurum (the chemical composition of gold) but has never 
seen gold and when she later sees gold and forms a visual conception of it, following from the reasoning of 
the knowledge argument again, it can be said that she gets a new piece of information which is not 
identical with what she has learnt and known about aurum. This again, according to Loar, does not follow 
(Loar 2002:296-297). 
5.  The feature of conception isolation or independence of phenomenal concepts allows that phenomenal concepts are 
understood to be conceptually different from physical concepts, which explains the epistemological ground that antiphys-
icalists base their arguments on. However, advocates of the strategy hold that this does not mean that what these con-
cepts pick out are ontologically distinct. See, Loar, B. (2002). “Phenomenal States” in Chalmers, D. J. (ed.) Philosophy of 
Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.
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One simple deduction from Loar’s analogical counter-examples is that it can be erroneously held that 
Mary learns a new fact after her release given the nature of phenomenal concepts, but the fact remains 
that she learns a physical truth in a new way. The experience of red which Mary has in her post-release 
stage is just another way of conceiving the physical truths learnt in her pre-release stage.
Another puzzle of consciousness is the conceivability argument which poses a metaphysical challenge 
to physicalism. Premised on the logical possibility of zombies or a zombie world, the argument holds that 
it is consistent with reasoning to conceive of physical duplicates of human beings which lack the 
phenomenal experience of human beings. If this is the case, it follows that consciousness is not identical 
with physical features of human beings. This argument was popularised by David Chalmers (1996:95-96). 
One of the ways physicalists have responded to this argument is the denial of a logical connection between 
conceivability and metaphysical possibility. This argument holds that the conceivability of zombies or a 
zombie world does not entail their metaphysical possibility, hence what the conceivability argument 
proposes is an impossible ontological arrangement. 
On the account of the phenomenal concept strategy, zombies or a zombie world are conceivable but 
their conceivability is one which is compatible with the thesis of physicalism. Katalin Balog (2012:8), while 
appealing to the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts, argues that the “reference of a 
phenomenal concept is determined by how it is constituted and not by any description that is a priori with 
the concept”. From this, it can be understood that the directness of phenomenal concepts allows for 
zombies or a zombie world to be conceived but disallows that this conceivability entails an ontological 
difference between physical and phenomenal truths.
Another means of assessing the conceivability argument from the critical lens of the phenomenal 
concept strategy is to consider the conditional statement formulation of the argument posited by 
Chalmers. Let P represent a complete physical truth about the universe and Q represent phenomenal 
truth about the universe. Thus, a physicalist proposal can be represented by the conditional: if P then Q. 
But in a scenario where it is possible to have a world physically identical to our world but lacking on the 
phenomenal front, this can be represented as P and not Q. Given this further conjunctional statement, it 
would follow that physicalism is false and the conditional (if P then Q) it assumes is not a priori necessary 
(Chalmers 2006, pp. 172-176). Phenomenal concept strategists’ response to this is that given the nature of 
phenomenal concepts the relationship between P and Q is necessary but a posteriori. What this means is 
that the conceptual but not ontological difference between phenomenal and physical concepts allows for 
the conjunction “P and not Q” but this does not translate to an ontological gap between P and Q.
Conclusion
From the arguments stated above, it must be noted that the criticisms raised by Michael Tye and David 
Chalmers against the phenomenal concept strategy take different logical paths. However, these criticisms 
fail in the bid to discredit the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy as a physicalist method 
developed in addressing the problem of consciousness. This is not to say that the phenomenal concept 
strategy is proof against flaws, but arguments in this paper have shown that the strategy does not falter in 
the face of the criticisms raised by Tye and Chalmers.
In the final analysis, it would be seen that Tye’s and Chalmers’ criticisms fail to capture the essential 
thesis of the phenomenal concept strategy. For the phenomenal concept strategy, when understood in its 
essential light, does not fall to the challenges raised by Tye and Chalmers. On another note, the 
phenomenal concept strategy has further been analysed in different ways to make up for challenges which 
has warranted different versions of the strategy. This is an indication that the physicalist project of 
developing the phenomenal concept strategy is being strengthened at every instance of being faced with 
challenges. Thus, the phenomenal concept strategy maintains its plausibility as a physicalist means of 
addressing the problem of consciousness.
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